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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NIXON & NIXON, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 16989 
JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES,. INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of 
a written contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The,case was tried in the District Court of Weber 
County to the Honorable Calvin Gould sitting without a jury 
on the 14th day of February, 1980. The Court entered a 
judgment restoring the parties to their status before the 
Agreement, relieving the Respondent JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., hereinafter referred to as New, from any duty to 
convey the property and awarded a money judgment to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant NIXON & NIXON, INC., hereinafter referred 
to as Nixon, in the amount of $76,928.73, together with 
interest in the amount of $20,562.83, and granted the 
~i~;~~;~~ hl;vnn ~ lien on the property to insure payment of Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the judgment and interest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent New requests that this Court affirm 
the judgment of Judge Gould. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
New was a general contractor, and the owner of a 
parcel of real property consisting of approximately 20 acres 
located in Weber County, Utah. New had previously mortgaged 
the property to Conunercial Security Bank, had defaulted on 
the mortgage, and the property was sold at Sheriff's sale. 
The period of redemption expired on the 20th day of November, 
19 7 8 • ( T-12 8) 
During the six-month redemption period, New sought 
money to pay off the bank, or purchasers who would purchase 
the property and thereby preserve for New his sustantial 
equity in the property. 
During this period of time, he, New, became acquainted 
with Jerry Olson, an employee of Nixon. New recited to Olson 
the nature of his problem concerning the property and solic-
ited Olson's help in securing a buyer. Olson requested a 
formal listing on the property which New refused on the 
. . 
grounds that he had other offer~, but did agree that in the 
event Olson securea a purchaser for the property, he would 
guarantee the payment of a commission. (T-127, 128) New 
ultimately signed a letter of agreement to pay the commission. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Li rary. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Sometime before the redemption period expired, 
Olson informed New that he had a buyer for the property. 
(T-130) However, two days prior to the expiration of the 
redemption period, Olson advised New that the sale had 
fallen through--that the buyer was no longer interested in 
the property. Mr. New .testified, 
" ... he (Olson) said, Mr. Nixon would buy 
it from me. He said don't worry, I have got 
it taken care of. Mr. Nixon is going to take 
care of you." (T-130, 131) 
Nixon and New met for the first time on November 20, 
1978, the date the redemption period expired. Nixon agreed 
to purchase the property for $130,000.00, of which approxi-
mately $76,000.00 would be required to redeem the property 
from the Sheriff's sale and the balance of $54,000.00 would 
be paid to New, ... "at a later date. " (T-13 3) 
They secured the services of attorney Donald c. 
Hughes, Jr. to draft the agreement. The parties met at the 
office of Attorney Hughes at approximately 4:00 o'clock in 
the afternoon. The contract was to be prepared and the 
property to be redeemed by 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon. 
The contract was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit C and admitted 
into evidence. 
At the time the contract was drawn, New considered 
the value of the property to be $202,000.00. (T-132) He 
advised Nixon that that was his value of the property and 
Nixon indicated that he was not going to pay that price, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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but Nixon did agree to pay $130,000.00 for the property. 
(T-133) 
The contract provided among other things that 
Nixon would pay the redemption price of $76,928.73; New 
"would convey title to the property free and clear of all 
liens"; and that Nixon "would use best efforts to prepare a 
subdivision plat and proceed with engineering and develop-
ment of the property at a· ·commercially reason·able speed." 
The contract further provided that six months from 
filing of the final plat, Nixon would pay to New the differ-
ence between the redemption price of $76,928.73 and $130,000.00. 
After the payment of the redemption price by 
Nixon, there was no further contact between Nixon and New 
for an extended period of time. Nixon did not execute and 
deliver to New a Promissory Ncte as provided by the contract 
·' 
and New did not execute and deliver a deed to Nixon as 
provided by the contract. New made many and repeated attempts 
to contact Nixon. He wrote him a letter on January 9, 
1979. (T-137) New said regarding attempts to contact Nixon, 
"I contacted them by mail two times, and I must 
have call~d them twenty." (T-138, 139) 
New went to see Nixon en the 23rd of January, 1979 
and found that Mr. Nixon's father'had just passed away and 
Mr. Nixon was unavailable. (T-139) 
On February 8, New went to visit Nixon in Logan 
to no avail, and subsequently sent him a message on the 
12th of February in an attempt to set up a meeting in Ogden. 
(T-139) 
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New went to Logan to visit with Nixon on the 7th 
of February, but Nixon was entertaining some people there 
and could not see him. New stayed in Logan overnight 
attempting to see him the following day and waiting for an 
hour or so, but Nixon didn't show up. Nixon's secretary 
told New he wasn't corning in until afternoon so New stayed 
until 2:00 o'clock, but Nixon did not show up and New returned 
to Salt Lake City. 
On February 28, New met with John Reeves of Reeves 
Engineering in Ogden, and discussed the development of the 
land and ultimately hired him to perform engineering services 
in regard to development of the property. (T-141) 
There was no further contact between Nixon and New 
until May of 1979 when Nixon discovered that New was pro-
ceeding to subdivide the property ... Nixon file~ an action 
against New and the matter proceeded to trial on February 14, 
1980. 
'ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT THE; CONTRACT WAS TOO VAGUE FOR SPECIFIC 
ENFORCEMENT. 
It has long been the po?ition of th~ Courts that 
contracts cannot and will not be enforced unless they are 
specifically definite so that the Courts can enforce them 
without re-writing the contract for the parties. Our high 
court made it clear in Bunnell v. Bills 368 P.2d 597, 13 
~~7 ---~-- .:~~e Court said at page 600, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitiz tion provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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"Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the 
courts only if the obligations of the parties are 
set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can 
be performed." 
The contract now before the Court requires that 
the buyer, Nixon, pay to the seller the difference between 
the redemption price of $76,928.73 and $130,000.00, or 
approximately $54,000.o'O six months after the final plat 
has been filed. The contract makes no requirement as to 
when that plat will be filed and it obviously depends upon 
preliminary engineering, approval of the City Council, etc., 
and the contract does not require that the subdivision plat 
be prepared within a specific period of time. In fact, the 
contract says at paragraph 3, 
"Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a 
subdivision plat and proceed with engineering 
and development of the property at a commercially 
reasonable speed." 
Nowhere in the contract is the phrase "commercially 
reasonable speed" defined. The evidence heard at trial 
indicates specifically that Mr. Nixon did little from the 
date the property was purchased, i.e. November 20, 1978, to 
develop the property. By his own testimony, the first 
action he took was in December and he simply contacted a 
land design company and had them take a look ~t it. He 
admitted, 
"They didn't perform any services on it. They 
did look at it, went down and took a look. But 
they didn't actually bill me any work." (T-90) 
Nixon then had another person, Jay Carlson, go 
down and look at the property, but Ca::·.~::-::::-::_- - -~ - """'___ L) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Nixon said that he then hired a Mr. Schwartz to do some 
surveying and engineering, but Schwartz did nothing until 
May, 1979, at which time he made some sketches and drilled 
some test holes on May 30, 1979. (T-92) 
It is clear that Nixon did nothing further on the 
property until he hear~ that Mr. New was developing the 
property, at which time he filed his Notice of Lis Pendens 
and cormnenced this action. 
This evidence alone may not justify the Court's 
ruling in this matter. However, taking the totality of the 
evidence heard at trial, it obviously became clear to the 
Court that not only was the phrase "commercially reasonable 
speed" vague and arnbigious, but the actions of Mr. Nixon 
indicated a desire on his part to do nothing for an extended 
period of time, if not to deliberately delay development. It 
is clear that New made many and repeated attempts to con-
tact Nixon and discuss the development of the property; 
New sent two letters, and must have called them twenty 
times. (T-139) Nixon did not respond and his attitude is 
characterized by his testimony when asked the question at 
trial relating to the time that had elapsed from the November 
purchase of the property until the 30th of M~y, 
Q. Dur~ng all this period of time, by the time 
you got some test holes, did you ever have a conversation 
with Mr. John New? 
to which he responded, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Q. Why not? 
A. Why should I? (T-92, 93) 
Nixon then went on to admit that he had seen some 
of the mail that had come from John New and that he had been 
advised that Mr. New wanted to meet with him and he simply 
said, " what's Jo~n got to do· with it?" (T-94) 
By the very terms of the contract, New was to 
deliver to Nixon a deed to the property. Nixon was to deliver to 
Mr. New a Promissory Note for the approximate sum of $54,000.00. 
It is simply not reasonable that Mr. Nixon would delay any 
contact between himself and Mr. New because he was simply 
too busy. 
The above questions make a little more sense when 
we look at the provision in the contract at paragraph 12, 
which states, 
"In the event, Buyer determines the development 
is untenable, Buyer may require Seller to rebuy 
the property for One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100 '000. 00)." 
The contract also provided at paragraph 13, 
"Time is of the essence to this agreement." 
This Court in Ferris· v. Je·nnings 595 P.2d 857 
(1979) held in a case in which specific performance was 
requested, at page 859 where the Court said, 
"We have no disagreement with the general 
proposition that a contract will not be 
specifically enforced unless the obligations 
of the parties are 'set forth with sufficient 
definiteness that it can be performed.' But 
to be co·ns'ide·red therewith is the further--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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proposition that the parties to a contract are 
obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate 
in erformin the contract in accordance with 
its expressed intent." Emphasis adde 
It is obvious that Nixon did not proceed in good 
faith to cooperate in performing the contract. His testi-
mony at the trial also ~ives some indication as to his 
thinking and his motivation in causing the delay. At the 
time of trial he was asked, 
Q. Why didn't you think it was important to talk 
to this man? 
A. It wasn't a matter of being important. It was 
important it was a matter of I just wasn't available, was 
busy as I could be. (T-95) 
Mr. Nixon's attitude was further clarified by his 
statement at the time of trial when I asked him, 
.• 
Q. Mr. Nixon, how much are you willing to give by 
way of promissory note to Mr. New today in exchange for the 
deed? 
A. Whatever I told you I would in that letter. 
Q. $9,000.00, right? 
A. Whatever it was. 
Q. $9,052.00. (T-84) 
Subsequently in the trial, I again asked the question of Mr. 
Nixon, 
Q. When you gave me a figure of $9,000.00 that you 
would accept today, and he gave you a deed, and you gave him 
~ nrnmissorv n~te for $9,000.00, a lot of interest was Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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computed that reduced the $54,000.00 down to nine, wasn't 
there? 
A. Well, I pulled off the terms of the contract 
and it reduces it by twenty some odd thousand there. And 
then there is some lienp that haven't been expunged yet that 
would have to be taken care of. And there is interest on 
the money that it has cost me in John holding me up from 
getting that thing done. (T-98) 
The contract does not provide for interest which 
Mr. Nixon admitted. (T-97) 
The Respondent New is certain that the< Coua:"t-1 · · · 
looked at the totality of the arrangement between the parties, 
the vagueness of the terms of the contract and the ability 
of Mr. Nixon to refrain from taking action. The Court 
ultim~tely held that the rights of' the defendant could not 
be ascertained or enforced except at the whim or caprice of 
the plaintiff and therefore found the contract unenforceable. 
The logic of the Court was sound. The capacity of Nixon to 
manipulate that contract to his benefit was obvious, and it 
was obvious that he did not care about the delay--the.delay 
was simply inuring to his benefit and to the substantial 
economic loss of Mr. New. It was· clear at the beginning of 
the contract that Mr. New would be entitled to approximately 
$54,000.00 less what it would cost him to remove some liens, 
etc., but his interest was substantial and at the time of 
trial, Mr. Nixon had now determined that New's interest had 
been diminished to the figure of $9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXERCISING ITS 
EQUITABLE RIGHTS TO DENY SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONTRACT. 
We have heretotore discussed the Court's ruling in 
Ferris v. Jennings in which the Court said at page 859, 
"But to be considered therewith is the further 
proposition that the parties to a contract are 
obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate 
in performing the contract in accordance with 
its expressed intent." 
This Court in Otteson v. Malone 584 P.29 878 
(1978) said at page 879, 
"In determining a grant of specific performance 
a court should examine the contract and the 
circumstances pertaining to its execution and 
formation, and determine whether there exist 
equitable grounds to grant or deny specific 
performance. In this connection a court may 
consider any evidence of ·concealment, over-
reaching, or misunderstanding on the part of 
the contracting parties which might result in 
a failure of ~eeting of the minds." 
The Respondent does not claim fraud or misrepre-
sentation in these matters, but it is clear by the evidence 
that Mr. New had a very valuable interest in this property 
; . 
and the only way he could realize his equitable interest in 
this property is to have it developed within a reasonable 
period of time. That was obviously his intent at the time 
the contract was signed; he believed he would receive approxi-
mately $54,000.00. 
Based on the events that occurred subsequent to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the signing of the contract, it appears obvious that it was 
not Mr. Nixon's intent to move with dispatch in the develop-
ment of the property and in accordance with his thinking, 
why should he? The interest of New diminished as time went 
on, and if and when Nixon reached a point where he thought 
the development of the.property didn't make any economic 
sense to him, he had the right, under the terms of the 
contract, to require New to pay him $100,000.00 and re-purchase 
the property. Based upon the testimony of New at the trial, 
the property was worth in excess of $200,000.00. (T-131) 
Nixon's counsel in his brief at page 18 argued 
that Nixon stood to lose more than New in the deal if the 
development of the property was delayed. We do not believe 
that is true. 
Obviously, Nixon put up approximately $77,000.00 
to purchase the property, but the property was worth $200,000 
plus and all he ever had to pay to New was the difference 
between the $77,000 he put up and $130,000, or $54,000, 
and New was obligated to pay off all the liens and encumbrances. 
Therefore, there was no way that Nixon could lose, and if he 
ultimately decided he no longer wanted to be bothered, and 
that was at his sole option, he could require. New to re-
purchase the prope;ty for $100,000. 
On the other hand, however, New's interest diminished 
as time went on and in the mind of Nixon by the time of 
trial, it had already been diminished by approximately 
$44, 000. 00 leaving only a $9, 052. 00 F~----->·~: ~~~-~,, ~-~ - ~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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was obligated to pay over to New. Admittedly, there were 
some liens that had to be removed, but it was evident at the 
time of the negotiation between the parties that most of the 
liens had already been paid, they simply had not yet been 
removed from the title to the property. (T-117) Nixon 
believed that most of the liens and encumbrances that had 
shown on the title report of the property had either been 
paid, settled or forfeited, and that in some way they had 
been taken care of. {T-63) 
Appellant claims that New is in violation of two 
fundamental maxims of etjuity, towit: "He who seeks equity, 
must do equity" and "He who comes into equity, must come 
with clean hands." He argues that New had taken matters 
into his own hands and had not sought judicial assistance 
when he took over the development of the property. It is 
clear, however, that New made many attempts to contact Nixon 
and Nixon would have nothing to do with him. He would not 
respond to his mail, he did not keep his appointments and he 
did not return calls. It was Nixon who prevented the 
diligent and expeditious development of the property for a 
benefit to himself and the detriment to New. 
CONCLUSION 
The contract did not provide a precise date at 
which time the money would be paid by Nixon to New; it did 
not provide a precise time in which the development would 
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commence or be completed. Nixon was able to delay development 
of the property and by so doing, was able to diminish the 
interest of New. Both parties agreed upon execution of the 
contract that New would receive approximately $54,000, since 
the liens had all eith~r been paid, released or should have 
been released, but by the interpretation of Mr. Nixon, he 
was able to dimish the proposed payment to New by approxim-
ately $44,000.00. 
The Court obviously saw through Nixon's scheme and 
rightly concluded that Nixon could manipulate the contract 
to his benefit and to the substantial economic detriment of 
New because the time the development was to commence was 
solely at the discretion of Nixon and in the event Nixon 
determined that he did not want to .proceed with development 
he could in turn require New to re-purchase the property for 
$100,000.00. 
The fact that times and dates were not firmly 
fixed by the parties, but within the sole discretion of 
Nixon and allowed~him to manipulate these matters to his 
benefit and to the detriment of New was deemed unconscionable. 
Hence, the Court properly exercised its equi~y powers to 
prevent that injustice. 
This Court, now having heard the testimony, should 
not now interfere with the lower Court's decision and Judge 
Gould's decision should be affirmed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1980. 
Respectfully 
-15-
submi:bs". 
RICHARD CHA ~ 
Attorn y for Defendant an 
Respondent 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Phone: 621-4430 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief to L. Brent Hoggan, Esq., Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 56 West Center Street, Logan; Utah 84321 
this ;<O day of October, 1980. 
f2ttua~~12 e~ 
Secretary 
;. . 
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